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Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg1
William M. Richman*
I was delighted to be invited to attend this Washington and Lee School of Law
Symposium and to contribute the views I expressed there to the published record of
the symposium. To one who has spent the better part of a career studying the
nonprecedent regimes of the United States circuit courts,2 it is especially gratifying
that the issue finally is beginning to attract attention beyond the narrow cadre of
federal court junkies who for thirty years have constituted "the usual suspects."3
The occasion for the resurgence of interest in the topic is the decisions in Hart
v. Massanari4 and Anastasoff v. United States5 and the promulgation of Proposed
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1(a) which provides:
1. The allusion is mixed, recalling both Shakespeare and the more mundane iceberg
aphorism. Elsewhere, Bill Reynolds and I have invoked the metaphor of the deck chairs on the
Titanic, so the iceberg metaphor seems uniquely appropriate. See William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1290, 1306
(1996) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Studying Deck Chairs] (using the Titanic metaphor to
highlight the need for change in the overworked courts of appeals).
* Distinguished University Professor, University of Toledo College of Law.
2. See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Justice and More Judges,
15 J.L. & POL. 559 (1999) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Justice]; William M. Richman, An
Argument on the Record for More Federal Judgeships, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 1 (1999);
William M. Richman, Rationing Judgeships Has Lost Its Appeal, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 911 (1997);
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The New Certiorari Courts, 80 JUDICATURE 206
(1997); Reynolds & Richman, Studying Deck Chairs, supra note 1; William M. Richman &
William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned
Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273 (1996) [hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, Elitism];
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the
United States Courts of Appeals-The Price of Appellate Reform, 48 CHI. L. REv. 573 (1981)
(detailing an empirical study commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center and published
separately as a monograph by the Center); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman,
Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DuKE L.J. 807 (1979); William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-LimitedPublication and
No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 1167 (1978).
3. The most usual are Thomas A. Baker, Paul Carrington, Martha Dragitch, Arthur
Hellman, Judith McKenna, Daniel Meador, John Oakley, Judith Resnick, William Reynolds,
Lauren Robel, Carl Tobias, Patricia Wald, Stephen Wasby, as well as the participants in this
symposium.
4. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the rule
generally prohibiting citation to unpublished decisions and orders is constitutional, but
counsel's violation does not warrant sanctions).
5. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that
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Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon
the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written
dispositions that have been designated as "unpublished," "not for
publication," "non-precedential," "not precedent," or the like, unless that
prohibition or restriction is generally imposed upon the citation of all
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions.
6
Proposed Rule 32.1, designed to eliminate one of the most egregious
ingredients of the nonprecedent program, proved quite controversial and
produced an unprecedented number of comments. Because the rule is quite
limited, the controversy is somewhat surprising. In the words of the Reporter,
It [the rule] takes no position on whether refusing to treat an "unpublished"
opinion as binding precedent is constitutional.... It does not require any
court to issue an "unpublished" opinion or forbid any court from doing so.
It does not dictate the circumstances under which a court may choose to
designate an opinion as "unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court
must follow in making that decision. It says nothing about what effect a
court must give to one of its "unpublished" opinions or to the
"unpublished" opinions of another court. The one and only issue addressed
by Rule 32.1 is the citation ofjudicial opinions that have been designated
as "unpublished."
7
From the historical perspective,8 the uproar over the rule is even more
curious, for the rule would affect only noncitation rules (and only in four of the
unpublished opinions have precedential effect), vacateden banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
6. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 31-32 (Aug. 2003). The rule also has a
provision (32.1(b)) requiring a party who cites an unpublished judicial opinion, order, or
judgment that is not available in a publicly accessible electronic database to file and serve a
copy of the opinion with the brief or other paper in which it is cited. See id. at 32 (providing the
proposed text of Rule 32.1 (b)). Note that, because of the terms of Rule 32.1 (a), subdivision (b)
cannot be read to permit the court to require parties to file and serve copies of all of the
unpublished opinions cited in their briefs or other papers unless the court generally requires
parties to file and serve copies of all the published judicial opinions cited. The rule requires
only the filing and serving of copies of an unpublished opinion if it "is not available in a
publicly accessible electronic data base." Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining
the Sturm Und Drang Over The Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE. L.
REv.1429, 1431 n.8 (2005).
7. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33-34 (Aug. 2003).
8. On the history and prehistory of the issue, see Penelope J. Pether, Take a Letter, Your
Honor: Outing the Judicial Epistemology ofHart v. Massanari, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1553
(2005); see also Penelope J. Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1442-44 (2004) (explaining the roles of the Federal
Judicial Center and the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System in the
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thirteen circuits), and those rules represent merely the tip of a much larger and more
dangerous iceberg---the two-track system ofjustice in our federal appellate courts.
From 1890 (the year of their establishment) until the mid-1970s, the circuit
courts handled their caseload by what we can term the traditional common law
appellate model: the judges heard oral arguments, conferred with their colleagues
on the panel, and sometimes with the help of a single clerk, wrote fully reasoned,
precedential, published opinions in nearly all cases.
Beginning in the 1970s, in response to a geometrically increasing caseload, the
judges began to abandon that model in favor of the two-track system of appellate
justice that prevails today. Now, the courts apply the traditional model to about
twenty percent of the caseload. The judges decide the remainder without oral
argument, without the traditional panel conference, and without a signed,
9
published, and precedential opinion.10 Moreover, the judges put relatively little
effort into the vast majority of their caseload while lavishing attention on the few
most worthy cases. Instead most of the work on "routine" cases is done by a large
corps of staff attomeys, typically recent law graduates, assigned to the court at large
rather than any particular judge." Typically, the judges' input amounts to a
"conference," lasting a few hours, in which a panel approves the staff attorneys'
draft opinions in as many as fifty cases.
Finally, the judges often do not make the crucial justice-rationing decisions
that determine which cases will fall on which track. Usually clerks and central staff
screen the appeals to determine which cases will fall into the favored minority
destined to receive traditional appellate process and which will comprise the vast
majority to be decided by the truncated process.' 2 Thus, an effective right to appeal
error to the circuit courts no longer exists; instead, litigants must petition the staffto
obtain access to the judges. In short, despite their statutory and historical role as
courts of appeals, the circuit courts have become certiorari courts.
original restrictions on publishing opinions to deal with increasing caseload volume).
9. See Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1607, 1632
(2005) (noting that, by signing an opinion, the judge takes moral and political responsibility).
10. Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges As Trustees of the Law: Publication as a Duty to
Account, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1637, 1644-46 (2005) (concluding that nonpublication
reduces the accountability and perceived legitimacy of judicial decisions).
11. See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 2, at 290 (explaining that the role of the
central staff is to conserve judicial effort by screening cases and participating significantly in the
opinion-writing and decision-making processes). Law clerks have trebled in the last thirty
years, and the number of central staff, virtually unknown thirty years ago, now outnumber
judges.
12. See Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential
Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755, 790 (2003) (noting that it is unwise to trust the tracking
decision to staff attorneys and clerks, most of whom are recent law graduates with little
knowledge of the legal method).
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The increasingly elaborate treatment of the favored twenty percent of the cases
highlights the inequity of the two-track system. Before the 1970s, a typical circuit
court opinion was relatively short and to the point, occupying an average of four
pages in the Federal Reporter. Today, those opinions often exceed twenty pages
and are researched and crafted with the care appropriate for scholarly law review
articles or treatises. 13  Moreover, they are afforded hyperprecedential effect,
controlling the decisions of subsequent panels unless overruled by the Supreme
Court or the circuit court sitting en banc.
The most obvious way to deal with the problem of volume in the circuit courts
without resorting to the two-track system is to create more judgeships. With its
current number of judgeships, each judge must decide on the merits of over 400
cases, in addition to writing opinions in some smaller number. Clearly that caseload
is incompatible with the traditional common law method of deciding appellate cases
and thus necessitates the two-track appellate justice system. The complement of
judges adequate to handle the job by the traditional method would be two or three
times as great as the current roster of less than 170.14
Then why not do it? Why not double the complement ofappellate judges and
thus restore the traditional method of deciding each appeal with an argument, a
conference, and a published precedential opinion written by Article Three judges?
The answer, of course, is that the politics are all wrong; but most of the opposition
has come from an unexpected source.
It would be understandable if the opposition were based on competing fiscal
demands. Circuitjudgeships are budgeted by the Administrative Office at close to
$1.5 million per year for each, so the arithmetic yields a figure of almost $300
million annually to staff the circuit courts at a level adequate to do their job via the
traditional method. That seems like a pretty respectable figure, but large numbers
are understandable only by comparisons. President Bush's tax cuts have deprived
the federal government of $168 billion dollars per year," and the effort to bring
democracy to Iraq has cost upwards of $ 100 billion per year.16 In fact, the Federal
13. Samuel A. Alito, How Did We Get Here? Where Are We Going?, Address to
Washington and Lee University School of Law Symposium: Have We Ceased to be a Common
Law Country? (Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Alito, Symposium Address].
14. See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM
ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPUCATIONS 9 (1993)
(noting that the Judicial Conference has adopted 255 merits dispositions as the maximum
desirable workload for a circuit judge).
15. Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, The Bush Tax Cuts So Far (July 2005)
(calculating tax cuts using the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy Tax Model and
averaging the totals for 2001 through 2005), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/gwbdata.pdf
16. See PHYLLIS BENNIS ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE IRAQ QUAGMIRE: THE
MOUNTING COSTS OF WAR AND THE CASE FOR BRINGING HOME THE TROOPS 12-13 (2005)
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Government spends less than 0.2% of the federal budget on the entire federal
judiciary, 17 and the additional $300 million required for 200 new judgeships would
account for less than 5% of that 0.2%. With the stakes so small, it seems unlikely
that the Congress or the Executive Branch would turn a deaf ear to determined
lobbying by the judiciary and the bar along with the united advocacy of a widely
disparate group of litigants.
18
The opposition, however, has not come from the taxpayers or a fiscally
responsible Congress (try to keep a straight face) or even from the military or other
federal government cost centers; rather, it has come from the judges themselves.
Based on an array of logically flawed and empirically groundless arguments, 19 the
("Congress has already approved four spending bills for Iraq with funds totaling $204.4
billion."), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/iraq/quagmire/IraqQuagmire.pdf.
17. News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Budget Cuts Leave 6% of
Federal Court Jobs Vacant (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press
Releases/LostJobs.pdf.
18. For a comparison of the requested and received judicial budgets, see Press Release,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judiciary Budget: Facts and Impact, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2005.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). In recent years,
Congress has been reluctant to fund the judiciary adequately, but the reluctance has focused
principally on staff and other para-judicial personnel. It is not completely clear what Congress
would do if faced with a compelling appeal from the judiciary for more judgeships, but it is
clear that those appeals have not been made.
19. Perhaps the most common argument against adding additional judgeships to
existing circuits is that the additional judges will decide more cases, and the law of the
circuit will become muddled and inconsistent. Adding judges increases geometrically the
total number of possible three-judge panels and thus decreases the predictability of decisions
within the circuit. That uncertainty in turn decreases the disincentives to appeal; if the result
in the case is less certain, then the conscientious advocate is more likely to recommend an
appeal to his client.
The fatal flaw of this argument is that the available empirical research does not support
it. There is no evidence that adding judgeships reduces the clarity of circuit law or increases
the rate of appeal. Indeed, the available evidence suggests the contrary, that more decisional
law within the circuit reduces uncertainty and increases the clarity of the law. Similarly,
there is no empirical evidence for the proposition that rates of appeal are at all affected by the
size of a circuit court or the amount of decisional law it produces. See JUDITH A. McKENNA,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS 93 (1993) (noting that a "strong majority" of appellate and district court
judges believed lack of clear precedent was not a large problem); Arthur D. Hellman,
Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 915 (1991) (concluding that a change in judicial structure would have an effect on
confidence and predictability in the courts of appeals); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practices of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 541, 597-99 (1989) (concluding that panel decisions in the Ninth Circuit are
not the only reason for inconsistency).
Similarly, there are arguments against increasing the number of circuits, principally that
it would multiply the number of intercircuit conflicts, which the Supreme Court, because of
its limited docket, would be unable to resolve. Once again, however, the available empirical
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Judicial Establishmene has rejected the one obvious solution to the problem of
appellate overload and the two-track system it has spawned: to petition Congress
for a substantial increase in the number ofjudges.
The transparent weakness of the arguments against expansion of the
judiciary generates the suspicion that there are ulterior motives for the
resistance, chief among them being the judges' desire to maintain a small, elite
federal judiciary. Judge Tjoflat, of the Eleventh Circuit, bases his anti-
expansionism, in part, on the fear of diminished "collegiality," suggesting that
"life as a judge on the jumbo court is comparable to life as a citizen in a big
city-life on a smaller court to life in a small town." 21 Undoubtedly to him and
many others, small-town life is more pleasant, but the judges' quality of life is a
minor value compared to the need to assure adequate appellate capacity for the
nation. Several writers have argued for the efficiency benefits from small size,
but again, the empirical research does not support the arguments.22
A more alarming ulterior motive is the judges' desire to safeguard their
own prestige and status. Sometimes the elitism appears as concern that an
enlarged federal judiciary will be unable to recruit and retain judges of
sufficient quality. Judge Newman worries that a larger appellate judiciary
would include "an unacceptable number of mediocre and even a few
unqualified people" and suggests that the quality of an enlarged federal
evidence is to the contrary. See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
UNRESOLVED INTERCIRCUrr CONFLICTS: THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM V (Final
Report: Phase I, Dec. 1991) (concluding that the numbers indicate a problem when the
Supreme Court cannot take all cases of intercircuit conflicts); Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent
Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 693,
797 (1995) (studying unresolved intercircuit conflicts and concluding "that unresolved
intercircuit conflicts do not constitute a problem of serious magnitude in the federal judicial
system"). This argument, like many on the topic, relies on the "parade of horribles" rhetorical
technique. See generally David S. Caudill, Parade Of Horribles, Circles of Hell: The Ethical
Dimensions of the Publication Controversy, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1653 (2005).
Lack of empirical evidence also afflicts many of the arguments marshaled against Rule
32.1. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, Judicial
Conference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1491 (2005)
(reporting empirical evidence casting doubt on arguments against Rule 32.1 that were marshaled
by Ninth Circuit judges and lawyers).
20. This is not to say that every Circuit Judge opposes a radical increase in the number of
judgeships; indeed some have supported it publicly. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to
Save the Federal Courts-Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52
(proposing that Congress double the size of the Courts of Appeals to give each case the
treatment it deserves). The point is rather that the judges who have been the most vocal and
most public and who control the courts' request to Congress have rejected that solution.
21. Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70.
22. See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 2, at 311-12 (attributing the increase in
appeal rate to changes in the justice system rather than the increase in judgeships).
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judiciary would be "indistinguishable from the most pedestrian of state
judiciaries. 2 3 Judge Rubin is even more explicit, linking the prestige of the
court to the exclusiveness of its docket: "The desirability of being a federal
judge is inversely proportionate to the number of routine cases brought to
federal court.... The professional quality of those who seek a federal
judgeship is inevitably affected by the prestige, the challenges and the
responsibilities of being a federal judge.
24
In the same vein, former Chief Justice Rehnquist deplored the "ever
increasing caseload with an ever larger percentage... of relatively routine
work which neither requires nor engages the abilities of a first-rate judge," and
Justice Scalia frets that a larger corps of judges "only dilutes the prestige of
office and aggravates the problem of image. 2 5 Were there any doubt about the
disdain some judges feel for the majority of their caseloads, Judge Edith H.
Jones dispels it with this marvelous comparison to elite athletes:
[A]s the docket is "dumbed-down" by an overwhelming number of routine
or trivial appeals, judges become accustomed to seeking routine methods of
case disposition.... The situation is like that of a competitive tennis player
forced to spend the bulk of his time rallying with novices. Just as the
player's competitive edge will erode from lack of peer contact, so are
judges' legal talents jeopardized by a steady diet of minor appeals.
26
Beyond the arrogant rhetoric, the judiciary's proposals for jurisdictional
contraction also suggest that elitism is a major reason for the opposition to
expansion. The cases proposed for elimination are usually the small-stakes
appeals brought by the poorest and least sophisticated federal litigants:
diversity cases below a large amount in controversy; ERISA claims; FELA and
Jones Act appeals; and prisoner's civil rights, social security, and employment
discrimination actions.
The judges are telling us in several ways, and as clearly as possible, that
they are far too important to be wasting much time on the "bottom" eighty
23. Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76
JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1993).
24. Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension between
Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 657 (1980).
25. Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
and the Natural Conference of Bar Residents (Feb. 15, 1987), in WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER &
RUSSEL R. WHEELER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (Long-Range Planning Series, Paper No. 2,
1994).
26. Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1995).
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percent of the docket.27 The quest for elite status and stimulating work, like the
desire for a small-court culture, are not evils in and of themselves. Still, they
weigh little in the balance compared to the nation's need for adequate appellate
capacity and the federal court system's need to retain its ability to "administer
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the
rich.
2 8
Judge Alito's response to the call for more judgeships is both more honest
than the arguments advanced by the judicial establishment and more humble
than the arrogant pronouncements of some of its prominent spokespersons. He
argues, quite correctly, that the additional judgeships would radically change
the nature of the circuit courts by requiring one or more of the following
changes: much larger circuits, many more circuits, specialized appellate courts,
or an additional level of appellate courts, either one between the circuit courts
and the Supreme Court, or one between the district courts and the circuit
courts.
29
Any of these measures would create an institution far different from the
circuit courts we know today and would require the courts to abandon several
cherished traditions: the small size and elite status of the federal judiciary, the
historical role of federal judges as generalists, the practice of allowing conflicts
to "percolate" before they reach the Supreme Court, and the traditional
conventions of circuit alignment.
30
As comforting and familiar as these traditions are, however, they are also
peripheral. The defining characteristic of the federal appellate courts has been
that the judges did their own high quality work, created a body of federal
precedent, and did not ration justice according to the status of the litigants. The
current two-track system of appellate justice, of course, jeopardizes those
defining characteristics. If the cost of saving them is the abandonment of some
peripheral traditions, though the price may be high, it is certainly a worthwhile
exchange.
27. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (Aug. 2003) ("The thirteen
courts of appeals have cumulatively issued tens of thousands of 'unpublished' opinions and
about 80% of the opinions issued the courts of appeals in recent years have been designated as
unpublished.").
28. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2005) (giving the judicial oath of office).
29. See Alito, Symposium Address, supra note 13.
30. See William M. Richman, Testimony Before the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeal (Apr. 3, 1998), available at
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/hearings/chicago/richman.htm.
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Further, the loss of the peripheral traditions is inevitable anyway. As
caseloads continue to rise, the system will seek to accommodate by increasing
the use of screening and triage, but at some point Congress, the bench, the bar,
and the public will cease to tolerate a regime that screens ninety or ninety-five
percent of the cases out of the traditional appellate process. The pressure to
expand will be irresistible, and loss of the peripheral traditions will occur
anyway.
To return to the central question of the symposium, it is apparent that the
circuit courts have ceased to operate as common law courts, denying even
persuasive authority to as many as eighty percent of their decisions.31 But when
we broaden the focus and consider the entire two-track appellate justice system,
it seems clear that the situation is worse yet. The courts, over time and
deliberately, have abandoned not merely the common law, but the rule of law
itself, or at least their obligation to be bound by it. After all, what is the rule of
law if it does not constrain the powerful, the law givers?
Without statutory authority, they have transformed themselves from courts
of mandatory jurisdiction (whose primary function is error correction) into de
facto certiorari courts, taking only those cases suitable for making law.32 Like
the Supreme Court, which by contrast has statutory authority, they hear the
cases and own the decisions that they choose, consigning the remainder to a
process that differs importantly from the traditional ideal of an appeal of right.33
This is not hyperbole, as will become all the more apparent when the
percentage of track-two cases rises from eighty to ninety or ninety-five. At that
point, the only distinction between track-two affirmances and the Supreme
Court's denials of certiorari will be the judges' assurances that they really do
"decide" the track-two cases. Those assurances have become harder and harder
to take seriously as the absolute number of track-two cases has increased.
Moreover, every indication is that the circuit courts are just as their
leading spokespersons would have them. The two-track system, which began
as a strategy of necessity for dealing with a caseload glut, has become congenial
and satisfying. It increases the judges' prestige and reduces their boredom.
Thus, prominent jurists have worked hard to resist any changes that would
31. Comm. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROcEDUtn OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (Aug. 2003) (noting that eighty percent of
Courts of Appeals opinions are unpublished).
32. See Reynolds & Richman, Justice, supra note 2, at 560 ("[T]he federal circuit courts
have drastically changed their procedures in order to accommodate caseload pressure.").
33. See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 2, at 341 ("The routine, trivial cases-
usually the ones brought by poorer, weaker litigants-are relegated to track-two appellate
justice.").
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return the courts to their original, mundane mission of error correction. I see
the orchestrated opposition to Rule 32.1 as part of that same campaign. The
rule is a first and very small step toward reestablishing in the circuit courts both
the mandatory appeal of right and the demanding, if sometimes unglamorous,
common law tradition. Of course it will be resisted.
